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Abstract
In this paper, we study the eﬀect of readmission treatment payment in a dynamic frame-
work characterised by competition among hospitals and sluggish beliefs of patients concerning
the service quality. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of readmission treatment payment depends on the
interplay between the eﬀect of quality in lowering readmissions and its eﬀect on future demand.
When the readmission occurrence strongly depends on the service quality, the higher the read-
mission treatment payment for hospitals, the lower the incentive to provide quality. Instead,
when readmission depends barely on quality, the readmission payment acts as the treatment
price for ﬁrst admissions, and thus it reinforces the incentive to provide quality. We also show
that the detrimental eﬀect of readmission payments on quality are fed by a high degree of
demand sluggishness, that is, by situation where current quality has modest eﬀect on future
demand changes. Our ﬁndings are robust to diﬀerent equilibrium concepts of the diﬀerential
game (i.e., open-loop and state-feedback). The results suggest that a discounted regulated price
for readmission can be an eﬀective (and cost-free) policy tool to improve healthcare quality,
especially when the market is characterised by sluggish beliefs about quality.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, several countries have introduced ﬁnancial public incentives to improve the quality
of healthcare, especially in the hospital sector, including a variety of pay-for-performance (or value-
based purchasing) programmes (Busse et al., 2011; Cashin et al., 2014; Milstein and Schreyoegg,
2016). In this respect, readmission rates are among the most widely used outcome-based indicators
of performance. The underlying idea is that, even if some readmissions are inevitable, a higher
quality of care reduces post-discharge complications and, thus, readmissions. Examples of health-
care policies targeting hospital readmissions can be found, among others, in the US and in the UK.
The US Hospital Readmission Reduction Program has introduced a penalty system for hospitals
with higher readmission rates for selected medical procedures (e.g., acute myocardial infarction,
hip replacement). Diﬀerently, the English NHS does not provide any payment to hospitals for
readmissions within 30 days of discharge.
Despite this increasing use in healthcare policy, only few recent theoretical papers analyse the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives linked to readmissions. Lisi et al. (2018) study a model of hospital
competition under a pay-for-performance programme which rewards lower mortality and/or read-
mission rates: they show that readmission rates are aﬀected by diﬀerent types of selection bias,
and this might lead to counterproductive eﬀects that can weaken the hospitals’ incentive to provide
quality. Guccio et al. (2016) analyse the role of readmission payment in a static framework where a
monopolistic hospital provides healthcare treatments, and chooses quality under diﬀerent payment
regimes: they ﬁnd that a higher readmission payment unambiguously reduces quality.1 They also
emphasise the role of readmission payment as an instrument to extract the hospital’s proﬁt.
In this paper, we study the eﬀect of readmission treatment payment in a dynamic framework
characterised by sluggish beliefs of patients concerning quality. In a similar framework, Brekke et
al. (2012) and Siciliani et al. (2013) show that demand sluggishness in regulated markets where
providers compete on quality −as, speciﬁcally, the healthcare market− reduces the incentives to
provide quality.
Here, we show that, once dynamic strategic interaction among hospitals is taken into account,
the eﬀect of readmission payment policy on the quality of care depends on the strength with which
1The links between competition, eﬃciency and quality provision in hospital sector are investigated by a large
body of theoretical and empirical literature. See, e.g., Bisceglia et al. (2018), Brekke et al. (2010, 2014), Levaggi et al.
(2012), just to mention a few contributions that could be easily reinterpreted by explicitely considering re-admission
payment as a tool to aﬀect hospitals’ quality provision.
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quality changes aﬀect future demand. Speciﬁcally, we show that a higher readmission payment
reduces the hospitals’ incentive to provide quality, if the eﬀect of quality in lowering readmissions
is higher than the eﬀect of quality in increasing future demand. Most importantly, we show that a
higher demand sluggishness increases the scope for the readmission payment being detrimental to
quality. Therefore, as a policy implication, our results suggest that, when the healthcare market
is characterised by sluggish beliefs about quality, a lower readmission payment might represent an
easy (and cost-free) policy instrument to counterbalance the perverse eﬀect of demand sluggishness
in the market.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the basics of the dynamic model,
largely borrowed from the diﬀerential game presented by Brekke et al. (2012), and focus on the
introduction of a speciﬁc readmission payment policy. In Section 3, we characterise the equilibrium
of the game, focussing on the eﬀect of readmission payment in steady-state quality, under the
open-loop solution concept. The features of the equilibrium under a diﬀerent solution concept (the
closed-loop state-feedback solution) are presented in Section 4 (and fully developed in Appendix).
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Following a well established literature line (e.g., Beitia, 2003; Brekke et al., 2011), we consider a
market for medical treatment à la Hotelling (1929) with two hospitals located (exogenously) at
either end of the unit line S = [0, 1]. On the line segment S there is a uniform distribution of
patients, with density normalized to 1, each demanding one medical treatment. The utility of a
patient who is located at x ∈ S and receiving treatment from hospital i, located at zi, is given by
U (x, zi) = v + kqi − τ |x− zi| (1)
where v is the gross valuation from medical treatment, qi ≥ q is the quality of treatment at hospital
i, and τ is the marginal disutility of travelling. The parameter k measures the marginal utility of
quality. The lower bound q is the minimum quality standard the hospitals are allowed to oﬀer and
is, for simplicity, set equal to 0, so that qi < q = 0 can be interpreted as malpractice.
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The patient who is indiﬀerent between hospital i and j is located at D∗, with
v + kqi − τD
∗ = v + kqj − τ (1−D
∗) . (2)
Hence, the potential demand for hospital i is
D∗ =
1
2
+
k (qi − qj)
2τ
(3)
implying that the hospital with a higher quality has a potential demand in excess of 12 . The extent
to which the diﬀerence in quality aﬀects the market share depends on the marginal disutility of
travelling relative to quality τk , with a higher
τ
k making demand less responsive to change in quality.
Healthcare demand is assumed to be characterised by sluggish beliefs about quality (Brekke et
al., 2012; Siciliani et al., 2013), which can be due to imperfect information about quality but also
to personal and familiar habits, typical in the demand side of the healthcare market. This implies
that changes in quality do not translate instantaneously into demand changes: we assume that,
at each point in time, only a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of patients become aware of changes in quality
and change their patronised provider. The law of motion of actual demand D (t) of hospital i, as
opposed to potential demand D∗ (t), is thus given by
dD (t)
dt
≡ D˙ (t) = γ (D∗ (t)−D (t)) . (4)
The lower is γ, the less actual demand responds to quality changes. Therefore, γ is an inverse
measure of the degree of sluggishness in patients’ beliefs about quality. Since total demand is
inelastic and constant over time, the law of motion of the actual demand of hospital j is then given
by
d [1−D (t)]
dt
= γ [(1−D∗ (t))− (1−D (t))] (5)
which can be easily rearranged as (4). D(t) and D∗(t) have to be interpreted respectively as the
"ﬁrst admission" actual and potential demand (also called the "index admission" in the context of
readmissions), that is, the demand for the treatment of a disease when it occurs.
The instantaneous cost of provision is given by a ﬁxed cost F and a variable cost C (·) increasing
and convex in output D and quality qi. Speciﬁcally, we assume that C (·) takes the following
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quadratic form:
C (D (t) , qi (t)) =
θ
2
q2i +
β
2
D2 (6)
with θ > 0 and β > 0. Hospitals receive (from a thrid part) a unit price p for each patient treated.
As usual in this framework, to ensure positive levels of quality in equilibrium, we assume that
p > β2 .
Let us underline that D (·) and C (·) refer to the ﬁrst-admission for the patient case treatment.
The novelty of the present model rests on the explicit consideration of readmission of treated
patients. We assume that each patient treated by hospital i has a probability R of being readmitted
for the treatment of the same (or related) disease.2 R can be interpreted as the fraction of patients
who need re-admission. It makes sense to assume that this fraction (or, equivalently, the probability
of being readmitted for each patient) depends on the quality oﬀered by hospital i. This means that
0 ≤ R (qi) ≤ 1 and ∂R/∂qi < 0. For simplicity, we assume that R (·) takes the following form:
R (qi) = max {1− δqi, 0} (7)
where δ > 0 is the marginal eﬀect of quality upon the probability of readmission. Although (7) is
a simplifying assumption, it has the advantage of keeping the model tractable while still having a
clear interpretation of the readmission "quality dependence".3,4 Of course, (7) entails parametric
restrictions on δ such that 0 ≤ 1− δq ≤ 1; below, we show that in this model, in front of sensible
assumptions, such parametric restrictions are not binding in steady state.
Then, whenever a patient is readmitted hospitals incur a readmission cost r, assumed to be
somewhat smaller than the marginal cost at the initial admission. This assumption on r should
capture the fact that patients readmitted usually do not need to repeat all medical procedures
performed at the ﬁrst admission, and their conditions are already known in the hospital. On the
2Available empirical evidence shows that the great majority (on average, around 85-90%) of patients needing
readmission are readmitted to the same hospital where they received the ﬁrst treatment (see, e.g., Staples et al.,
2014; Tsai et al., 2015; McAlister et al., 2017). Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, readmission here is intended
as the readmission to the same hospital. Nonetheless, our main conclusions would not be qualitatively aﬀected by
explicitly considering that a small fraction of patients needing readmission may be re-treated by the other hospital.
3 In fact, modelling the readmission probability as a non-linear function bounded in the domain [0, 1] would make
the following analysis intractable.
4Notice that this form of readmission probability allows us to have a more general interpretation of the utility of
patients, as represented by eq. (1). In particular, suppose that patients suﬀer a disutility η in case they are readmitted
and, furthermore, they know it happens with probability (7). Then, the expected utility of a patient who is located at
x ∈ S and receiving treatment from hospital i, located at zi, is given by E [U (x, zi)] = v+kqi−η (1− δqi)−τ |x− zi|,
which can be written as (1) with v˜ = v − η and k˜ = k + ηδ. Therefore, we can interpret the parameter k as the
expected marginal utility of quality.
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other hand, hospitals receive a payment λp, with λ ∈ [0, 1]. When λ = 1, hospitals receive a
full price p, as for the ﬁrst admission; when λ = 0 instead, hospitals receive nothing and, thus,
suﬀer the readmission cost. Therefore, (λp− r) represents the proﬁt margin from a readmitted
patient, and (λp− r)D (t)R (qi) can be interpreted as the expected proﬁt from readmissions. Note
that the nature of the cost function associated to readmission treatments is diﬀerent from the cost
associated to ﬁrst treatments. In particular, the cost function of readimitted patients is linear in
quantity. This assumption not only obeys reasons of analytical convenience,5 but it is intended to
underline that readmission has a truly diﬀerent nature as compared to ﬁrst admission (readmission
has simply to adjust or to complement the previous treatment).
We assume that each hospital maximizes the present value of its expected proﬁt, which also
includes the potential proﬁt from readmitted patients. Speciﬁcally, the instantaneous expected
proﬁt of hospital i is given by
E [πi (t)] = pD (t)−C (D (t) , qi (t))− F + (λp− r)D (t)R (qi) (8)
and the problem of hospital i (deﬁning ρ as the rate of time preference) can be outlined as follows:
Maximize
qi
 +∞
0
E [πi (t)] e
−ρtdt
subject to
D˙ (t) = γ (D∗ (t)−D (t)) (9)
D (0) = D0 > 0 (10)
where qi is the control variable.
We are in front of a diﬀerential game.6 In what follows, we characterise the Nash equilibrium,
assuming an open-loop information structure. Under this information structure, players choose the
optimal plan at the beginning of the game, knowing the initial state of the system (i.e. D (0) = D0),
and then stick to it forever (i.e. qOLi = f (t)). Then, we ﬁnd the state-feedback solution
7 (with
5Quadratic cost function for readmission treatments would lead to a cubic objective function.
6Basar and Olsder (1995), Dockner et al. (2001), Basar and Zaccour (2018) are reference books for diﬀerential
games.
7We borrow the label from Basar et al. (2018); state-feedback solution is also known as closed-loop feedback
solution. For a deeper discussion of the solution concepts of diﬀerential games see also Cellini and Lambertini (2004).
Brekke et al. (2012) discuss the diﬀerent solution concepts in a speciﬁc application to health economics.
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analytical details available in Appendix). Under this solution concept, players observe the value of
the state variable in each period of time (i.e. D (t)), and set the optimal choice in each period of
time, depending on the current value of the state variable (i.e. qSFi = f (D (t))).
3 Open-Loop solution
The current-value Hamiltonian associated with the maximization problem is:
Hi = pD −
θ
2
q2i −
β
2
D2 − F + (λp− r)D (1− δqi) + µiγ

1
2
+
k (qi − qj)
2τ
−D (t)

(11)
where µi is the current-value co-state variable associated with the state equation. The open-loop
solution satisﬁes:
∂Hi
∂qi
= −θqi − (λp− r)Dδ + µi
γk
2τ
= 0 (12)
µ˙i = ρµi −
∂Hi
∂D
= (ρ+ γ)µi − [p+ (λp− r) (1− δqi)− βD] (13)
D˙ =
∂Hi
∂µi
= γ

1
2
+
k (qi − qj)
2τ
−D (t)

(14)
to be considered along with the transversality condition lim
t→+∞
e−ρtµi (t)D (t) = 0.
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By diﬀerentiating (12) with respect to time, substituting µ˙i with (13) and D˙ with (14), we
obtain
q˙i = (ρ+ γ) qi +
δγk
2τθ
(λp− r) qj +

(λp− r)
δ (ρ+ 2γ)
θ
+
γkβ
2τθ

D −
γk
2τθ

p+ (λp− r)

1 +
τδ
k

(15)
which, along with (14), describe the dynamics of the system. Speciﬁcally, the dynamics around the
steady-state, with symmetric qualities, can be represented in matrix form as follows:

q˙ (t)
D˙ (t)

=
(ρ+ γ) + δγk2τθ (λp− r) (λp− r) δ(ρ+2γ)θ + γkβ2τθ
0 −γ
 q (t)
D (t)

+

− γk2τθ

p+ (λp− r)

1 + τδk

γ
2

(16)
where the 2-by-2 matrix is the Jacobian J of the dynamic system. It is straightforward to see from
J that the equilibrium is stable in the saddle-path sense, i.e., there is only one admissible path
8 In order to meet the second-order condition, it is suﬃcient that the Hamiltonian is concave in the control and
the state variables: Hqiqi = −θ < 0, HDD = −β < 0, HqiqiHDD > (HDqi)
2 or θβ > (λp− r)2 δ2 which is satisﬁed if
the cost function is suﬃciently convex.
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leading to the steady-state.9
3.1 Steady-state quality and readmission payment
The steady-state level of quality, i.e. q˙ = 0 and D = 12 , is given by
qOL =

p− β2

k − (λp− r)

τδ

1 + ργ

− k

2τθ

1 + ργ

+ (λp− r) δk
. (17)
Also in the present model, like in Brekke et al. (2012), the comparative statics of (17) with respect
to γ unambiguously shows that a higher degree of sluggishness in patients’ beliefs about quality
reduces steady-state quality:
∂qOL
∂γ
=
kτρ

p− β2

2θ + (λp− r) 2θ + (λp− r)2 δ2

[2τθ (ρ+ γ) + (λp− r) δkγ]2
> 0. (18)
Furthermore, a higher marginal cost of quality (θ), a higher marginal cost of output (β) and a
higher rate of time preference (ρ) reduce steady-state quality.10
More interestingly, the comparative statics with respect to the readmission payment (λ) yields
∂qOL
∂λ
= −pk

τ
kδ

1 + ργ

− 1

2τθ

1 + ργ

+

p− β2

kδ
2τθ

1 + ργ

+ (λp− r) δk
2 . (19)
From (19), it can be seen that ∂qOL/∂λ is not unambiguously negative, as one might expect. Specif-
ically, the term which determines the eﬀect of λ upon the steady-state quality is

τ
kδ

1 + ργ

− 1

,
9Speciﬁcally, the Jacobian in (16) has two eigenvalues λ1 = (ρ+ γ) +
δγk
2τθ (λp− r) > 0 and λ2 = −γ < 0, with
tr (J) = ρ+ δγk2τθ (λp− r) > 0 and det (J) = −γ

(ρ+ γ) + δγk2τθ (λp− r)

< 0.
10 It is also easy to show that, as in Brekke et al. (2012), the lim
γ→1,ρ→0
qOL is equal to the Nash equilibrium quality
in a corresponding static model where D is equal to (3).
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and in particular ∂qOL/∂λ < 0 if

τ
kδ

1 + ργ

− 1

> 0; more conveniently:11
∂qOL
∂λ
< 0 if δ >
k
τ

1
1 + ργ

. (20)
Notice that δ is the expected marginal cost (beneﬁt) of increasing (decreasing) quality in term of
lower (higher) expected readmissions. Moreover, kτ

1
1+ρ/γ

can be interpreted as the discounted
marginal beneﬁt (cost) of increasing (decreasing) quality in term of higher (lower) future demand.
Therefore, condition (20) simply states that if the expected marginal cost of increasing quality
is higher than the discounted marginal beneﬁt of doing so, then a higher readmission payment
represents an incentive for hospitals to lowering quality.12 These results can be summarised by the
following:
Proposition 1 The eﬀect of a higher readmission payment (λ) on steady-state quality is not un-
ambiguous. If the marginal eﬀect of quality in lowering readmission probability (δ) is higher than
the discounted marginal eﬀect of quality in increasing future demand

k
τ

1
1+ρ/γ

, then a higher
readmission payment (λ) reduces steady-state quality.
The intuition for this result is clear: if hospitals received a high payment for patients readmitted
(jointly with a suﬃciently small eﬀect of quality upon future demand), a (perverse) incentive would
operate to reduce quality in order to increase readmissions (i.e. ∂q
OL
∂λ < 0). On the other hand, if
readmissions depend barely on quality (i.e. δ is suﬃciently small)13, a higher λ acts just as a higher
p, since it increases the expected revenue from future patients and, thus, provides an incentive to
increase quality in order to attract more future patients (i.e. ∂q
OL
∂λ > 0). Therefore, in this latter
case there is no reason for healthcare policy to reduce readmission payment.
11From (17), it can be seen that the steady-state quality qOL is positive so long as δ <

(λp−r)+(p−β2 )
(λp−r)

k
τ

1
1+ ρ
γ

.
Since

(λp−r)+(p−β2 )
(λp−r)

> 1, the condition (20) is consistent with a positive steady-state quality, which also guarantees
that 1 − δqOL < 1. Furthermore, when δ = kτ

1
1+ ργ

, it can be seen that 1 − δqOL > 0. To see this, notice that
1 − δqOL > 0 requires that (λp− r) −

p− β
2

> −2θ
	
τ
k


1 + ρ
γ
2
, which is guaranteed by the assumption on
marginal treatment costs.
12Notice that δ > k
τ


1
1+ρ/γ

is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for ∂q
OL
∂λ
< 0. In fact, from (19) it can be
easily seen that the necessary condition for ∂q
OL
∂λ < 0 is δ >
1
τ
k

1+ ρ
γ

+
(p−β/2)
2θ
k
τ

1
1+ρ/γ
 , which is clearly less stringent
than δ > k
τ


1
1+ρ/γ

.
13More speciﬁcally, ∂q
OL
∂λ
> 0 so long as δ < 1
τ
k

1+ ργ

+
(p−β/2)
2θ
k
τ

1
1+ρ/γ
 , which is strictly positive and fully
consistent with a positive steady-state quality (see the condition in footnote 10).
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Finally, it can be seen that a higher demand sluggishness (i.e., a lower γ) increases, ceteris
paribus, the scope for λ reducing steady-state quality. Let us deﬁne δ¯ = kτ

1
1+ρ/γ

, i.e. δ¯ is the
smallest marginal eﬀect of quality in the probability of readmission, suﬃcient to guarantee that
∂qOL
∂λ ≤ 0. The interplay between demand sluggishness and readmission payment is summarised in
the following:
Proposition 2 A higher degree of demand sluggishness (the inverse of γ) in the healthcare market
reduces the smallest marginal eﬀect of quality in the probability of readmission

δ¯

suﬃcient to
guarantee that a higher readmission payment (λ) reduces steady-state quality and, thus, increases
the scope for being the readmission payment (λ) detrimental to quality.
The intuition for this result is that, when demand is sluggish, hospitals do not expect to bear
a signiﬁcant cost (in term of lower future demand) from lowering quality. Thus, in this context,
readmissions may become an attractive source of revenue, and -cynically enough, admittedly- even
a small eﬀect of quality in reducing readmissions might restrain hospitals from providing higher
quality.
Therefore, when the healthcare market is characterised by sluggish beliefs about quality, there
are at least two reasons for regulators (policy-makers) to reduce readmission payment and, in
particular, to avoid providing a full readmission payment (i.e. λ = 1). First, if demand is sluggish,
it is more likely that a full readmission payment provides a perverse incentive for quality provision;
instead, a lower readmission payment might crowd-out this ﬁnancial incentive. This is the case, for
instance, with λ = rp for which the proﬁt margin from readmitted patients is exactly neutralized.
Second, when the demand is sluggish, hospitals have low incentives to provide a high quality of
healthcare services because they do not expect to get a signiﬁcant beneﬁt in term of higher future
demand. In this context, a lower readmission payment might represent an easy and cost-free policy
instrument to counterbalance the demand sluggishness in the market. In this respect, notice also
that, if the degree of demand sluggishness is high (i.e. γ is low), the usual price instrument p is
less eﬀective in stimulating quality, beyond being not cost-free.
4 State-Feedback solution
The open-loop solution is appropriate when players set their plans at the beginning of time, and
the pattern of choice variables only depends on time. Players have to use open-loop solution if
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they cannot observe the dynamic evolution of the state of the world, or they have to commit to
a plan. An alternative solution, widely considered by literature, is the state-feedback solution, in
which players’ control variables depend on current state variable(s). It is easy to obtain this type of
solution in problems with a linear-quadratic structure, like in the present case, guessing a quadratic
form of the value functions and a linear form for the control variable of each player, obeying the
Bellman equation.
In the presence of readmissions, the substantial solution of the model turns out to be similar
as in Brekke et al. (2012), apart from diﬀerent coeﬃcients in the linear equation describing the
equilibrium solution for the choice variables. Also the properties of the steady-state are the same,
apart from diﬀerent parametric conditions assuring the full stability of the dynamic system. The
detailed calculations for the state-feedback solution are provided in the Appendix. Speciﬁcally, the
state-feedback decision rules are given by:
qi = φi(D) =
γk
2τθ

α1 +

α2 −
2 (λp− r) δτ
γk

D

(21)
qj = φj(D) =
γk
2τθ

α1 +

α2 −
2 (λp− r) δτ
γk

(1−D)

(22)
where
α1 =
p+ (λp− r) + γα22

1− γk
2
2θτ2

α2 −
2(λp−r)δτ
γk

γ + ρ− γ
2k2
4θτ2

α2 −
4(λp−r)δτ
γk
 > 0 (23)
α2 = −
2θτ2

ψ − 2γ − ρ− γkθτ 2 (λp− r) δ

3γ2k2
< 0 (24)
and
ψ :=

2γ + ρ+
γk
θτ
2 (λp− r) δ
2
+
3γ2k2
θ2τ 2

θβ − (λp− r)2 δ2

.14 (25)
The corresponding steady-state quality is obtained by applying the steady-state conditionD = 12
14Notice that the concavity condition of the value function requires that θβ > (λp− r)2 δ2, which is the same
condition we found for the concavity of the Hamiltonian in the open-loop solution.
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to (21) and (22). The comparative statics with respect to the readmission payment (λ) yields
∂qSF
∂λ
=
γk
2τθ
 p

1 + γkδ2θτ α2

− γkδθτ pα1
γ + ρ− γ
2k2
4θτ2

α2 −
4(λp−r)δτ
γk


−p
δ
2θ
1 + 23


2γ + ρ+ γkθτ 2 (λp− r) δ

− 3γk2θτ (λp− r) δ
ψ
− 1

 . (26)
The second term in (26) is unambiguously negative, as the expression in the square brackets,
although negative, is strictly included between zero and one in absolute value. Therefore, the sign
of (26) depends on the ﬁrst term. In particular, it is easy to see that

1 + γkδ2θτ α2

< 0 is suﬃcient
condition for having ∂qSF /∂λ < 0 ; put in a diﬀerent, more convenient, way:
∂qSF
∂λ
< 0 if δ >
3γk
τ

ψ − 2γ − ρ− γkθτ 2 (λp− r) δ
 . (27)
The condition assuring ∂q
SF
∂λ < 0 is more cumbersome in the case of the state-feedback solution
as compared to the open-loop solution. This is not surprising, as long as the eﬀect of quality
changes on future demand is less trivial under the state-feedback information structure, due to
the intertemporal strategic interaction among players. From (27), however, we can see that the
underlying economic factors at work are similar to (20). Overall, we can see that also in the state-
feedback solution the eﬀect of the readmission payment (λ) is not unambiguous, and it depends on
the interplay between the characteristics of the healthcare market (such as, the degree of demand
sluggishness) and the marginal eﬀect of quality in lowering readmission probability.
5 Concluding remarks
We have revisited the dynamic model of quality competition among healthcare providers − let us
think of hospitals − by explicitly modelling the case of readmission. Healthcare services are char-
acterised by speciﬁc features, including asymmetric information and demand sluggishness, which
make competition among providers and market regulation peculiar in this sector. In the present
study, we have focussed on the role played by the regulated price associated to readmitted patients.
We have shown, in a diﬀerential game framework, that a discounted regulated price associated to
readmission treatment can be an eﬀective (and cost-free) policy tool to improve healthcare quality.
12
However, its eﬀectiveness depends also on the characteristics of the healthcare market. In partic-
ular, we have found that, in front of a sluggish demand, it is more likely that a full readmission
payment provides a perverse incentive for quality provision. In this context, a discounted read-
mission payment might crowd-out this perverse ﬁnancial incentive. We have also shown that the
eﬀect of readmission payment is not equal across medical treatments, but it plays a major role in
treatments where readmissions are more "quality dependent". Our results are robust to diﬀerent
assumptions concerning the information sets of players, that is, they hold under both the open-loop
and the state-feedback Nash equilibrium of the diﬀerential game.
In recent times, diﬀerent countries have adopted policy measures providing a discounted (if not
null, such as in the UK and Germany) regulated price for readmissions. The theoretical model pre-
sented in this paper supports this choice, but at the same time it makes clear that the eﬀectiveness
of a reduced readmission payment policy in stimulating the quality of care is conditioned by several
factors, even in a very simpliﬁed theoretical framework. In this respect, our theoretical model
can contribute to the literature dealing with the links among competition, eﬃciency and quality
provision in the hospital sector: it makes clear, once again, that the relations are far from being
clear-cut, and several factors interact in determining the ﬁnal eﬀects of competition and incentives
upon quality provision.15 With speciﬁc reference to readmission payment as a policy tool, we have
shown that there is no reason for healthcare policy to reduce readmission payment for medical
treatments where readmissions depend barely on quality. Our results can have also implications
for the empirical investigation of the eﬀect of readmission payment policy; in particular, our results
suggest that readmission policy should be more eﬀective in medical sectors where readmissions are
more sensitive to quality and where demand is more sluggish.
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Appendix: The State-Feedback solution
In this Appendix we illustrate the underlying calculations for the state-feedback solution presented
in Section 4. The hospital i’s instantaneous proﬁt is given by
pD −
θ
2
q2i −
β
2
D2 − F + (λp− r)D (1− δqi) (A1)
which, together with the linear dynamic evolution of the state variable D˙ (t) = γ (D∗ (t)−D (t)),
gives rise to a linear-quadratic problem. In this class of problems, the solution can be found by
guessing a quadratic form of the value function and, then, by ﬁnding the parameter values that
meet the Bellman equation. Therefore, we assume that the value function of hospital i takes the
following form:
Vi (D) = α0 + α1D +
α2
2
D2 (A2)
which implies ∂Vi∂D = α1 + α2D, and requires α2 < 0 in order to meet the concavity condition.
The Bellman equation associated with the hospital i’s maximization problem is given by
ρVi (D) = max

pD −
θ
2
q2i −
β
2
D2 − F + (λp− r)D (1− δqi) +
∂Vi
∂D
γ

1
2
+
k (qi − qj)
2τ
−D

.
(A3)
Maximization yields −θqi − (λp− r)Dδ +
∂Vi
∂D
γk
2τ = 0, and after substituting
∂Vi
∂D , we obtain
qi = φi(D) =
γk
2τθ

α1 +

α2 −
2 (λp− r) δτ
γk

D

(A4)
and, by symmetry,
qj = φj(D) =
γk
2τθ

α1 +

α2 −
2 (λp− r) δτ
γk

(1−D)

. (A5)
Substituting (A4) and (A5) into (A3), yields
ρVi (D) = pD −
θ
2
γ2k2
4τ2θ2

α1 +

α2 −
2 (λp− r) δτ
γk

D
2
−
β
2
D2 − F
+(λp− r)D

1− δ
γk
2τθ

α1 +

α2 −
2 (λp− r) δτ
γk

D

+(α1 + α2D)γ

1
2
+
k
2τ

γk
τθ
α2 −
2 (λp− r) δ
θ

D −
1
2

−D

. (A6)
16
The value of parameters (i.e. α0, α1, α2) consistent with the above equality are given by the
following system of equations:
ρα0 −
γ
2
α1 +
γ2k2
8θτ2
α21 +
γ2k2
4θτ2
α1α2 −
γk
2θτ
(λp− r) δα1 + F = 0 (A7)

ρα1 + γα1 − p− (λp− r)−
γ
2
α2 +
γ2k2
4θτ2
α22 −
γ2k2
4θτ2
α1α2 +
γk
θτ
(λp− r) δα1 −
γk
2θτ
(λp− r) δα2

D = 0
(A8)
ρ
α2
2
+
β
2
+ γα2 −
3γ2k2
8θτ2
α22 +
γk
θτ
(λp− r) δα2 −
(λp− r)2 δ2
2θ

D2 = 0 (A9)
Condition (A9) provides two candidate solutions for α2:
α2 =
2θτ2
3γ2k2
2γ + ρ+ γk
θτ
2 (λp− r) δ

±

2γ + ρ+
γk
θτ
2 (λp− r) δ
2
+
3γ2k2
θ2τ2

θβ − (λp− r)2 δ2

(A10)
from which we take the negative root in order to ensure the concavity of the value function. Then,
from (A8) we obtain:
α1 =
p+ (λp− r) + γα22

1− γk
2
2θτ2

α2 −
2(λp−r)δτ
γk

γ + ρ− γ
2k2
4θτ2

α2 −
4(λp−r)δτ
γk
 . (A11)
Following the same argument as in Brekke et al. (2012, p. 170), it can be shown that α1 is positive
for all permissible parameter conﬁgurations. Finally, α0 can be easily obtained by substituting
(A10) and (A11) into (A7).
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